d20d5e8fb5
Add a proper public-facing documentation site using Mintlify with 19 MDX pages covering getting started, auto mode, commands, configuration, and all user-facing features. Move internal/SDK documentation (Pi SDK, TUI, context & hooks, research notes, ADRs) to docs-internal/ since they should not be part of the public documentation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Security & Trust Boundaries
Hard Boundaries — Things the Agent Should NEVER Do (Universal Agreement)
| Forbidden Action | Why |
|---|---|
| Access production systems directly | Agent's world is the dev environment, full stop |
| Access or embed secrets | API keys, credentials should never appear in agent context or output |
| Make network requests to arbitrary destinations | Restrictive firewall, whitelist only required services |
| Modify its own orchestrator, prompts, or tools | Prevents removing safety constraints |
| Execute commands outside the project directory | Sandbox to project dir + temp working dirs only |
The Sandboxing Architecture
| Layer | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Execution | Containerized (Docker + seccomp), restricted filesystem, network policy |
| Filesystem | Content-addressable storage — agent proposes changes, backend validates before writing |
| Secrets | Vault proxy with short-lived tokens, never direct credentials |
| Commands | Parsed and blocked for dangerous patterns (rm -rf /, curl to unknown hosts) |
| Dependencies | Approved dependency list — new deps require auto-approval (pre-approved list) or human approval |
The Capability-Based Security Model
The orchestrator runs outside the sandbox. The agent requests operations through a controlled API. The orchestrator validates every request before executing. The agent doesn't have direct access to anything — it has access to tools that the orchestrator mediates.
The Subtle Risk
The agent introduces vulnerabilities not through malice but through plausible-looking insecure patterns: string concatenation for SQL queries, disabling CORS for convenience, logging sensitive data for debugging. Security linting rules should be tuned to catch these AI-common patterns specifically.
The Trust Model
Think of the agent as a highly capable but unvetted contractor. Give them the codebase and dev environment. Don't give them production credentials, deployment access, or the ability to modify security infrastructure. The goal isn't to make the agent safe by limiting capabilities — it's to make the environment safe so the agent can be maximally capable within it.